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A DELAYED PENALTY: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ILYA KOVALCHUK
ARBITRATION DECISION ON THE
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
MORGAN MARCUS*
The overall structure of this [Standard Player Contract] reflects not
so much the hope that [Ilya] Kovalchuk will be playing in those
advanced years, but rather the expectation that he will not.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 16, 2004, the National Hockey League ("NHL"
or "League"), already in significant economic peril, underwent an
owner-induced lockout that rendered the 2004-2005 season
canceled. 2 At the time, the NHL owners contended that $224
million was lost during the previous season and that without
significant change to team payroll and players' share of Leaguewide revenue, a lockout was the only remedy. 3 For a league
struggling to survive, the player/owner standoff had been brewing
for some time. 4
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School 2012. The author would like to
thank the various members of the Law Review for their hard work. The
author would also like to thank his parents, Jacqueline and Harvey, for their
constant support, and for always encouraging him to reach for the stars.
1. Nat'l Hockey League v. Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n,

-,_

at

http://offsidesportsblog.
at
available
Arb.),
(Bloch,
(2010)
17
blogspot.com/2010/08/analysis-of-kovalchuk-decision.html.
2. Lockout Over Salary Cap Shuts Down NHL, ESPN (Feb. 16, 2005, 11:41
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1992793.
3. See Michael K. Ozanian, Ice Capades, FORBES.COM (Nov. 29, 2004),
http://www.forbes.comlfreeforbes/2004/1129/124.html (noting the issues of
transparency in the NHL's computation of losses as a significant reason for
the labor dispute); see also ARTHUR LEAVITT, JR., LEAVITT REPORT:
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE COMBINED FINANCIAL RESULTS OF THE

NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 2002-2003 SEASON (Feb. 5, 2004), available at
(illustrating an
http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cbalarchivellevitt/levittreport.pdf
independent review of the NHL's Unified Report of Operations ("URO") for the
2002-2003 season to establish the financial results for that season). The URO
results show an operating loss to the NHL for the 2002-2003 season at $273
million and nineteen out of thirty teams reporting operating losses for the
season. Id. at 21.
4. See LEAVITT, JR., supra note 3, at 2 (stating that "[t]he current
relationship between League-wide player costs and League-wide revenues is
inconsistent with reasonable and sound business practices. Player costs of
145
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The year-long lockout had far reaching implications not only
on the then NHL structure, but also on its economic viability in
the future.5 With the signing of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement ("2005 CBA") on July 13, 2005, the NHL ushered in a
new era dictated by a hard salary cap that sought not only to make
the League structurally feasible, economically speaking, but also
to make the product on the ice more entertaining in an effort to
increase revenue and fan base.6
The 2005 CBA included a club payroll range with upper and
lower limits, but did not include a luxury tax, something the
players demanded.7 In the time since the signing of the 2005 CBA,
there has been relative labor peace, but like the other major
professional sports, (Major League Baseball ("MLB"), National
Basketball Association ("NBA"), and National Football League
$1.494 billion or 75% of revenues substantially exceed such relationships in
both the NBA and the NFL as those relationships are set forth in their
collective bargaining agreements.").
5. See Stan Fischler, Fischler: Happy Days are Here Again for NHL,
HOCKEY JOURNAL.COM (June 9, 2010), http://www.hockeyjournal.cominews/20
10/06/09_fischler.php (noting the struggle of the NHL to regain its fan base
after the 2004-2005 lockout as "Chicago, home to one of the Original Six-and
the country's third-largest media market . . . muster[ed] a paltry season ticket
base of just 3,400 in 2007."); see also Majority of U.S. Hockey Market
Newspapers not Covering Cup Finals, ESPN (June 2, 2007, 5:41 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/playoffs2007/news/story?id=2891383 (describing
the efforts of the NHL to attempt to increase coverage of the Stanley Cup
finals between the Anaheim Ducks and the Ottawa Senators); NHL Team
Valuations, FORBES.COM (Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/3
1/biz 07nhl NHL-Team-ValuationsIncome.html (illustrating that based on
the 2006-2007 season, half of the League was operating in the red); Tarik ElBashir & Thomas Heath, NHL's Strong Comeback Marred by Poor TV
Ratings, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp(describing the
0400897.html
dyn/content/article/2006/06/04/AR200606
economic effects of dropping television ratings as the NHL and ESPN parted
ways as ESPN declined to offer upfront rights fees for airing of games). The
NHL agreed to a new contract in August 2005 with Comcast-owned Outdoor
Life Network ["OLN"], which subsequently changed its name to Versus. Id.
The NHL national rights fee contract with OLN amounted to about $2 million
per team, in contrast to the NFL, which earned its teams about $100 million a
year. Id. As a result, the NHL received little revenue from their OLN contract.
Id.
6. NHL Enacts Rules Changes, Creates Competition Committee, NHL.COM
(July 22, 2005), http://www.nhl.comlnhlhq/cba/ruleschanges072205.html
(noting new rules sought to instill competitive balance).
7. Commish 'A Luxury Tax Will Not Work", ESPN (Dec. 1, 2004, 8:20 PM),
http://sports.espn.com/nhl/news/story?id=1935455; see also Kevin Allen &
Mike Brehm, Black Ice: NHL Season Cancelled, USATODAY.cOM, Feb. 21,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/2005-02-16-season2005,
cancelx.htm (defining cost certainty as the "limiting [of] player compensation
to a fixed percentage of revenue."). Commissioner Bettman suggested that this
cost certainty was critical not only in terms of agreement over the new CBA
but also in terms of future promotion of the NHL product. Id.
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("NFL")) the threat of a strike or lockout due to labor war is
omnipresent as the next round of CBA negotiations approaches .
While the NHL has recovered from the negative effects of the
lockout, the recent arbitration decision involving Ilya Kovalchuk
("Kovalchuk") is significant enough to send shivers down the spine
of any hockey fan with the end of the 2005 CBA looming.9
The NHL voided the contract between Kovalchuk and the
New Jersey Devils on July 20, 2010, because the NHL deemed
that it circumvented the League's salary cap. 0 The NHL Players'
Association ("NHLPA") then filed a grievance on behalf of
Kovalchuk." On appeal, arbitrator Richard Bloch ("Bloch"), agreed
with the NHL and voided the contract.12 The contract offer stood to
give Kovalchuk $102 million over seventeen years.13 However,
Bloch saw issue with a "no-movement clause" that transitioned
into a "no-trade clause" after year eleven of the contract.14

8. See Kelly Ousted as Head of NHLPA, ESPN (Aug. 31, 2009, 8:50 PM),

http://sports.espn.go.comlnhl/news/story?id=4433555 (explaining the reasons
why NHLPA head Paul Kelly was removed from his post as executive
director); but see Frank Hughes, Preparing for Worst, Union Stresses
2010),
(Jan. 9,
Solidarity as Labor Unrest Looms, SLCOM
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/basketball/nba/01/09/hunter.labor/index.
html (articulating the fears of a potential NBA lockout eighteen months before
the old CBA was to expire). See John Melloy, NFL Lockout Fear Sacks
DirecTV Stock, CNBC.COM (June 17, 2010, 3:03 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
id/37756415INFLLockoutFear SacksDirecTVStock (contemplating the hit
on DirecTV stock as a result of apprehension over a potential NFL lockout
after the 2010 season).
9. Jeff Z. Klein & Stu Hackel, Slap Shot; A Labor Dispute Still Shapes the
3,
2010,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst
N.H.L.,
N.Y. TIMES,
Jan.
(discussing
/fullpage.html?res=9A01EEDF73EF930A35752COA9669D8B63
that "[n]ever before had an entire North American professional sports season
been lost because of a labor dispute. It was not merely the pivotal event of the
decade for the NHL; it was perhaps the pivotal event in the modern history of
pro hockey.").
10. Allan Muir, Why Lower the Hammer Now?, SI.coM (July 21, 2010, 12:28
AM),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/allanmuir/07/2 1/deal.rea
ct/ index.html.
11. NHLPA Files Grievance, SI.CoM (July 26, 2010, 2:25 PM),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/hockey/nhl/07/26/kovalchuk.grievance/in
dex.html.
12. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that the contract
was structured in such a way that it was doubtful that a significant portion of
the deal would be performed).
13. Id. at 1-2.
14. Id. at 18. See Craig Custance, Kovalchuk Ruling Benefits Long-Term
Health of NHL, SPORTINGNEWS (Aug. 11, 2010), http://aol.sportingn
ews.com/nhl/story/2010-08-09/kovalchuk-ruling-benefits-long-term-health-nh
(noting that:
[t]he transition from a no-move clause to a no-trade clause in the final
six years would have given the Devils the flexibility to place Kovalchuk
on waivers or send him to the minors during that span. Considering it
would give New Jersey an annual salary cap relief of around $6 million,
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More importantly, Bloch condemned the significant frontloading of the contract and its apparent goal to skirt the salary cap
provisions of the 2005 CBA.15 The deal, which would have been the
longest in the history of the NHL, stood to pay Kovalchuk ninetyseven percent of the full contract value within the first eleven
years of the contract.16 The NHL argued that the last six years of
the deal, the final three percent of the contract value, were
illusory, and neither Kovalchuk nor the Devils intended him to
fulfill those years of the contract.' 7 Therefore, the NHL was able to
score a crucial victory over the NHLPA with the upcoming CBA
expiration on the horizon.' 8
The function of this Comment is to evaluate the significance
of the Kovalchuk arbitration decision on the current NHL
structure and ultimately to argue how the NHL should approach
the impending negotiations over the terms for the new CBA. Part
II of this Comment examines the origins of the NHL and the
construction of the 2005 CBA. Part II will also illustrate the
context for the Kovalchuk decision and the glaring problems of the
2005 CBA. Part III analyzes the impact of Bloch's decision on
current NHL players' contracts and a team's ability to utilize its
salary cap space to sign players generally. This section also details
the importance of the decision in terms of the 2011-2012
negotiations over a new CBA. Additionally, Part III will evaluate
how the NHL and NHLPA will rely on the Bloch opinion, along
with principles related to labor, contract, and antitrust law to gain
leverage in their collective bargaining negotiations.
Part IV proposes a long-term solution for the NHL to
incorporate into the new CBA, based upon prior experience and

waiving Kovalchuk would almost be too good an option to pass up for the
GM running the team in the 2020s.).
15. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 17-18 (detailing the effect,
rather than the intent, of the agreement between Kovalchuk and the Devils
was questioned, specifically because by year eleven of the deal, Kovalchuk
would have already received $98 million of his $102 million contract).
16. Id.
17. See Press Release, Proskauer Rose LLP, NHL Prevails in Arbitration
Over Rejected Kovalchuk Contract (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.proskauer.com/
nhl-prevails-in-arbitration-over-rejected-kovalchuk-contract-08-17-2010/
(noting that "the effect [of the agreement] ... would defeat the intentions of
the parties as outlined in the team payroll range provisions.").
18. See Shawn P. Roarke, NHL Players Association will not Re-open CBA,
NHL.COM (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=405957 (noting
that the NHLPA had an option to re-open the CBA by September 15, 2009, but
decided against it). The NHLPA also had an option to extend the CBA for one
additional year at the end of the term which they opted to exercise on June 22,
2010. Press Release, NHLPA.com, NHLPA Executive Board Exercises its
Option to Extend Collective Bargaining Agreement (June 22, 2010),
http://www.nhlpa.com/News/Media-Releases/Details.aspx?R=753E1E1A-6CF841C7-B9C4-2DE654DE7ABF.
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the Bloch decision, to avoid a protracted labor dispute. This reform
includes a significant redrafting of Article 26, which deals with
circumvention. In support of this modification, the NHL must
make concessions to the NHLPA regarding escrow account
contributions while at the same time maintaining the general
structure of the 2010 amendment to the 2005 CBA, which allowed
for greater contractual certainty for long-term contracts. With this
structure in place, the NHL should additionally look to add greater
flexibility to the CBA through the use of a franchise player, or
similar device.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Background Behind the 2004-2005 Lockout

The modern game of ice hockey derives its origins from the
late nineteenth century.' 9 However, the NHL was not officially in
business until 1917, when the League was formed from the ashes
of the National Hockey Association. 20 At the outset, the NHL was
comprised solely of Canadian teams: the Ottawa Senators,
Montreal Canadians, Montreal Wanderers, Toronto Arenas, and
Quebec Bulldogs. 21 Even in its infancy, the NHL was in a constant
battle for its survival.2 2 As the NHL expanded into the United
States and became established with more teams and stadiums, the

19. HISTORY OF HOCKEY, http://www.historyofhockey.net/history-oflhoc
key.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011); see also STAN FISCHLER, FISCHLER'S
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF HOCKEY 19 (Warwick Publishing Group 1993)
(noting that the foundation for North American professional hockey was the
emergence of the National Hockey Association ["NHA"]).
20. HISTORY OF HOCKEY, supra note 19; see also John McGourty, NHL
Dropped the Puck 91 Years Ago, NHL.coM (Dec. 19, 2008, 10:00 AM),
http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=398815 (noting that the NHL was
established to eliminate one of the owners in the NHA, who, after not being
included, brought several lawsuits against the NHL); see MOREY HOLZMAN &
JOSEPH NIEFORTH, DECEPTIONS AND DOUBLECROSS: HOW THE NHL
CONQUERED HOCKEY 22 (Dundern Press 1989) (describing the circumstances
behind the NHL's humble beginnings).
21. McGourty, supra note 20; see also FISCHLER, supra note 19 (explaining
that free agent competition was a significant issue, even then, as the Pacific
Coast Hockey Association and NHA were in constant battles over player
services).
22. See HOLZMAN & NIEFORTH, supra note 20, at 147 (discussing the
competition for players amongst the NHA, Pacific Coast Hockey Association,
and Western Canada Hockey League (renamed the "Western Hockey League")
prior to the creation of the National Hockey League). See also ERIC
WHITEHEAD, THE PATRICKS: HOCKEY'S ROYAL FAMILY 143 (Doubleday Canada
Limited 1980) (discussing the disintegration of the Pacific Coast Hockey
League and the subsequent merger with the Western Hockey League). At this
point, the NHL had emerged as the forerunner in terms of profitability and
sustainability. Id.
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League was not met by immediate success. 23 More often than not,
the NHL dealt with financial difficulty. 24
In 1967, the NHLPA was officially certified as a union and
became the exclusive bargaining representative of the NHL
players governed under the National Labor Relations Act. 25 In the
1970s, the NHL faced significant competition from the World
Hockey Association. 26 Then, in the 1990s, play came to a standstill
with the 1994-1995 104-day lockout. 27 The owners were seeking a
salary cap, 28 changes to free agency, and salary arbitration to curb
bulging salaries. 29 The players, on the other hand, were fighting
for a luxury tax.30 The result of the lockout was, among other
concessions, a rookie salary cap, but the sides did not agree on a

23. See FISCHLER, supra note 19, at 32-33 (discussing that "[t]he WCHL,
which closed after the 1925-1926 season, ultimately proved the prime feeder
for the expanding NHL which became a ten-team league split between
Canadian and American divisions."). Even with the increase in teams, clubs on
both sides struggled significantly during the Great Depression. Id.
24. See id. at 65 (noting the advent of the television had a significant effect
on NHL attendance, and large market teams like the Boston Bruins and
Chicago Blackhawks nearly had to fold due to decreased attendance).
25. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 507 (Praeger

Publishers 3d ed. 1992) (noting that NHL players began pursuing unionization
in the 1950s but were not recognized as a union by the League until the late
1960s).
26. See FISCHLER, supra note 19, at 114 (contending that competition from
the World Hockey Association made a significant "dent" in the rosters of many
of the NHL teams). The NHL was so concerned by the increased influence of
the WHA that by the 1976-1977 season several NHL leaders proposed that a

merger take place. Id. at 119. The WHA lasted until the 1978-1979 season,
when the NHL merged with the WHA, thereby integrating four of the WHA
teams (Oilers, Whalers, Jets, Nordiques). Id. at 123. See also Phila. World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 467 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (discussing that the WHA, seeking a preliminary injunction, challenged
the NHL's "reserve system" under antitrust law, stating that the NHL was
acting monopolistic with regard to players services). This action led to the
merger of several WHA teams into the NHL. WONG, supra note 25, at 474.
27. See We've Been Here Before, CBC, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/
cba/features/flashback.html#1994 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (explaining that
the precursor to the 1994 lockout was the player-induced 1992 strike, which
led to concessions regarding marketing rights for the players but only included
a two-year deal). Even at this time, a growing concern for the League was the
rapidly increasing salaries and the decreasing team revenue. Id. At the end of
the 2003-2004 season, the owners locked out the players after both sides could
not come to terms. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. (noting that the NHL wanted a sliding tax system that would
fine teams who exceeded the League average payroll, but the NHLPA was
adamantly opposed to the idea thinking it amounted to a salary cap which
would artificially limit salaries).
30. See id. (describing the "five percent solution" as a way to help small
market teams through revenue sharing). Essentially the NHLPA envisioned a
payroll and gate receipt tax of the top sixteen teams in the League. Id.
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salary cap or luxury tax. 31 Accordingly, the 1995 CBA was not the
answer to the problems facing the League as issues remained over
how to properly aid small-market teams, whether through a salary
cap or luxury tax.3 2
With the 1994 lockout still within memory, the NHL and
NHLPA geared up for the 2004 CBA negotiations. 33 In 2004, the
owners wanted a harder salary cap, one that provided what NHL
Commissioner Gary Bettman ("Commissioner") referred to as "cost
certainty,"34 while the players were again seeking a system similar
to MLB with a luxury tax.35 To combat rapidly increasing player
salaries, the Commissioner sought to install a salary cap to
balance owners' revenue with players' salaries. 36 The NHLPA
shirked the concept of limiting salaries through a cap.3 7 The NHL
and NHLPA agreed to a new CBA on July 22, 2005, but not before
the League locked-out the players for the entire season.3 8 The 2005
CBA was made effective retroactive to September 16, 2004, the
day after the 1995 agreement expired, and was to remain effective
for five years provided that the NHLPA did not elect for early
termination or extend the CBA by one year.39 The NHLPA elected
to do the latter. 40
31. See id. (detailing that, rather than a salary cap, the sides agreed on a
complex system that put greater limits on free agency in the hopes of curbing
escalating salaries).
32. See id. (noting that nothing specifically was done to aid small-market
teams, something that would come to become a critical issue).
33. Klein & Hackel, supra note 9.
34. Id. (stating that "[t]he League's owners' said they were spending around
seventy-five percent of their revenue on salaries and wanted to implement a
salary-cap structure that would link players' salaries to owners' revenue.").
35. Jim Kelley, 'Independent'Audit Yields Same Results, ESPN (Feb. 12,
2004, 8:37 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/columns/story?columnist=kelle
yjim&id=1733827.
36. The Leavitt Report largely served as Commissioner Bettman's focal
point in promoting the hard salary cap as it showed the majority of the League
reporting operating losses for the 2002-2003 hockey season. LEAVITT, JR.,
supra note 3, at 3; see also We Can't Live any Longer' Under this CBA, ESPN
AM),
http://sports.espn.go.comlnhl/news
2004,
3:45
(May
26,
/story?id=1809397 (noting the owners were determined to set in place a hard
salary cap to limit the amount players were getting from League revenue).
37. Kelley, supra note 35; see also Klein & Hackel, supra note 9 (detailing
that the players only accepted the salary cap after fear that they may possibly
lose another season).
38. Collective BargainingAgreement: Board of Governors Ratifies Collective
Bargaining Agreement, NHL.coM (July 22, 2005), http://www.nhl.com/ic
e/page.htm?id=26390.
39. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY
LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION 11 (July 22,
2005) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT], available at
http://www.nhlfa.com/CBA/2005-CBA.pdf.
40. NHLPA Elects to Raise Cap 5 Percent, NHL.COM (June 22, 2010, 3:53
PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=532352. See also Pierre LeBrun,
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B. Kovalchuk's StandardPlayer Contractwith the Devils
Kovalchuk was drafted first by the Atlanta Thrashers in the
2001 NHL Entry Draft and quickly established himself as one of
the elite players in the League. 4 1 In February 2010, at the age of
twenty-seven, he was traded to the Devils after the Thrashers and
Kovalchuk were unable to come to terms on a long-term
extension. 42 After completing the 2009-2010 season, Kovalchuk
became a free agent on July 1, 2010, and teams across the NHL
fought to sign him to a long-term contract. 43 On July 19, 2010,
Kovalchuk came to an agreement with the Devils.44
The proposed Standard Player Contract ("SPC") between
Kovalchuk and the Devils was structured to terminate after the
2027 season, at which time Kovalchuk would be forty-four years
old. 45 Ending speculation, the League rejected the SPC on July 20,
2010.46 The rejection letter stated:
We believe the structure of the SPC on its face constitutes an
impermissible "retirement-contract," pursuant to which the parties
can have no reasonable expectation of complete performance in
Union Picks

up

CBA

Extension

Option,

ESPN

http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=5316505

(June

22,

2010),

(noting the decision is

significant because the NHLPA remained without an executive director at the
time and that teams will be able to use the "performance bonus cushion"
provision of the CBA for the 2010-2011 season which allows bonuses beyond
the salary cap to be carried over to the next season). The NHLPA also voted to
retain the five percent "growth factor," which allows the salary cap to be
raised from $57 million to $59 million per team. Tripp Mickle, NHL Expects
Total Revenue to Top $2.7B, SPORTS Bus. J. (June 28, 2010), available at
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/66122.
41. See Ilya Kovalchuk, HOCKEY-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.hockeyreference.com/players/kfkovalil01.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2011) (stating
that Kovalchuk won the Maurice Richard Trophy for the 2003-2004 season in
which he tied Jarome Iginla of the Calgary Flames and Rick Nash of the
Columbus Blue Jackets with forty-one goals). The Maurice Richard Trophy is
an annual award given to the top goal scorers based on the regular season.
Trophies, Maurice Richard Trophy, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/trophies/
richard.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
42. See Pierre LeBrun, Devils Acquire Kovalchuk, ESPN (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:35
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=4888109
(describing the
reason that the Thrashers decided to trade Kovalchuk rather than resign him
to a long-term extension).
43. See Shawn P. Roarke, Report: Kings Re-Enter the Kovalchuk Fray,
NHL.coM (July 7, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?
id=533937 (explaining the competition over the summer of 2010 for
Kovalchuk's services between the Devils, Los Angeles Kings, New York
Islanders, and SKA St. Petersburg in Russia's Kontinental Hockey League).
44. Dave Caldwell, Devils Keep Kovalchuk but Deal Could Cost Them Some
Veterans, N.Y.
TIMES,
July
19,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/07/20/sports/hockey/20devils.html.
45. Id.
46. NHL Rejects Kovalchuk's 17-Year Deal with Devils, NHL.CoM (July 20,
2010, 10:31 PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=534717.
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accordance with its terms ... the SPC in question is intended to or
has the effect of defeating or Circumventing the provisions of the

CBA.47

The NHLPA objected to the League's action and filed a
grievance on July 26, 2010.48 The grievance was heard before
Bloch August 4, 2010.49
The NHLPA, represented by John R. McCambridge and
Michael P. Conway, argued that the Kovalchuk SPC did not
violate any of the CBA provisions, which limit the "form and
content" of SPCs.so The NHLPA reasoned that the 2005 CBA did
not expressly disallow the terms and content in the Kovalchuk
SPC and, therefore, the NHL should accept the contract.51 On the
other hand, the NHL contended the SPC amounted to a
circumvention of the 2005 CBA under Article 26.52 The League
stated:
We believe this SPC constitutes an improper manipulation of
payroll room, improperly and currently lowering its average Club
salary and potentially giving the Club an artificial and
inappropriate increase above the upper limit, although nominally
remaining within.5 3
The NHL contended that the last six years of the Kovalchuk
SPC were "illusory" and that there was an expectation between
the parties that the last years of the deal would not be

47. Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 2-3.
48. See Dan Rosen, NHLPA Files Grievance on Kovy Contract, NHL.COM
(July 26, 2010, 1:39 PM), http://www.nhl.comlice/news.htm?id=534934 (noting

that the NHL and NHLPA would need to mutually agree on the hiring of a
system arbitrator, and after appointing an arbitrator, he or she would have
forty-eight hours to rule on the grievance).
49. See Veteran Arbitrator Richard Bloch To Serve NHL/Kovalchuk Case,
SPORTs Bus. DAILY (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.s

Bloch's
arbitrator
(discussing
portsbusinessdaily.com/article/141120
distinguished career with arbitration work in both the private and public
sectors). Bloch has previously served as an arbitrator or mediator for the NHL,
NBA, NFL, and MLB. He also has extensive experience regarding CBA related
grievances. Id.; see also Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 2-3.
50. See Nat'1 Hockey League, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that "[tihere are no

negotiated restrictions [in the 2005 CBA] that would serve to restrict the term,
annual salary stipends, 'backdive' (decreased payments during the final years)
or Move/Trade language."). The NHLPA argued principally that the structure
of the SPC was permitted under the 2005 CBA. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 3-4. Article 26 of the 2005 CBA deals with the concept of
circumvention. Id. The Preamble to Article 26 reads, "[tihis Article 26 is
designed to prohibit and prevent conduct that Circumvents the terms of this
Agreement, while not deterring or prohibiting conduct permitted by this
Agreement, the latter conduct not being a Circumvention." COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 115.
53. Nat'1 Hockey League, supra note 1, at 4.
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performed. 54 As a result, the NHL insisted it had the power under
Article 11 of the CBA to reject the SPC.56
Bloch, under the authority vested by Article 48 and through
the consent of the parties, determined that the SPC did in fact
have the effect of circumventing the provisions of the 2005 CBA.56
However, Bloch concluded that neither Kovalchuk nor the Devils
operated in bad faith or showed intent to circumvent the salary
cap and payroll provisions.5 7
On August 9, 2010, Bloch ruled in favor of the NHL and
voided the SPC, which made Kovalchuk an unrestricted free
agent.5 8 The decision contained a section regarding the effect of the
judgment on other contracts, which was veiled toward the end of
the opinion.5 9 It reads: "While the contracts [Chris Pronger, Marc
Savard, Roberto Luongo, and Marian Hossa's] have, in fact, been
registered, their structure has not escaped League notice: those
SPCs are being investigated currently with at least the possibility
of a subsequent withdrawal of the registration."60 The League was
looking into the contracts under the scope of Bloch's opinion. 61

54. Id. at 5. The NHL contended that the final six years of the contract
were throw away years, designed specifically to lower the salary cap hit. Id.
There is statistical data to show that their argument has strong merit. Id. See
NHL Average Retirement Age Between 1917/18 - 2005/06 Seasons, QUANT
HOCKEY, http://www.quanthockey.com/Distributions/RetireeAgeDistribution.
php#Calc (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (illustrating average age of retirement
over the course of NHL history).
55. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that Article 11
covers the rules and procedures governing the SPCs). Section 11.3 states "no
SPC shall be valid or enforceable in any manner whatsoever unless and until
it has been filed with Central Registry and approved by the League or the
Arbitrator." COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 40.
Section 11.6 details grounds for when a SPC or offer sheet may be rejected:
"(A) [I]t results in the signing Club exceeding the Upper Limit, or (B) because
it does not comply with the Maximum Player Salary or (C) because it is or
involves a Circumvention of either the Club's Upper Limit or the Maximum
Player Salary." Id. at 42.
56. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that the effect of
the agreement led to the conclusion that it was "reasonably unlikely that the
last years of the contract [would] be performed.").
57. See id. at 19-20 (discussing this distinction because the showing of an
intentional circumvention of the CBA and a violation of the team payroll range
would likely bring punishment from the League for the Devils, Kovalchuk's
agent, and potentially Kovalchuk himself).
58. Joe Yerdon, NHL Wins Contract Grievance Case Against Ilya
Kovalchuk; Kovalchuk A Free Agent Once Again, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2010,
5:26 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2010/08/nhl-wins-contract-grie
vance-case-against-ilya-kovalchuk-kovalchuk-a-free-agent-once-again.php.
59. Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 19 n.23. "Each of these players
will be 40 or over at the end of the contract term and each contract includes
dramatic divebacks." Id.
60. Id.
6 1. Id.

2011]

A Delayed Penalty

155

On August 27, 2010, Kovalchuk and the Devils submitted a
new SPC for League approval. 62 The contract was approved by the
League after it agreed with the NHLPA on an amendment to the
2005 CBA covering long-term contracts.6 3 In addition, the NHL
reprimanded the Devils with a penalty for their actions during the
negotiations. 64 The implications of the decision are just now being
felt.65 What remains to be seen is how the judgment will affect
subsequent contract negotiations for other free agents and
ultimately the next round of CBA negotiations when the parties
can rely on contract, labor, and antitrust law to impose their
respective will. Creating a comprehensive collective bargaining
agreement that appeases all parties is likely impossible; however,
the NHL must look to structure an agreement that provides for a
long-term solution, rather than a short-term fix as has been done
in the past. That is the only way that labor unrest, and possible
antitrust lawsuits, can be avoided.

III.

ANALYSIS

The 2005 CBA brought significant change to the structure of
the NHL.66 By most estimations, the League scored a significant
62. See Devils Submit Revised Contract for Kovalchuk, Await OK, CBS
SPORTS.COM (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/story/13832167/de
(reporting the new
vils-submit-revised-contract-for-kovalchuk-await-ok/rss
amount of the contract at $100 million over fifteen years).
63. See NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement Governing Long-Term Contracts,
NHL.COM (Sept. 4, 2010, 3:43 AM) [hereinafter NHL, NHLPA Reach
Agreement], http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=536880 (noting that the
NHL would register the SPC filed with the League August 27th and would
cease circumvention investigation into the contracts signed by Marian Hossa,
Marc Savard, Roberto Luongo, and Chris Pronger). More significantly, the
parties agreed on a new salary cap system regarding the limitations for longterm contracts which would affect contracts of five years or longer, and only
contracts executed after September 4, 2010. Id.
64. See Allan Muir, Devils Catch Hell for Kovalchuk Deal, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/allan muir/09/14/
kovalchuk.sanctions/index.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2010, 2:53 PM) (noting
that the NHL imposed a sanction on the Devils of $3 million and two high
draft picks, which was the maximum penalty imposable under the agreement
forged between the NHL and NHLPA after the first Kovalchuk SPC was
rejected).
65. Id. See also Mickle, supra note 40 (explaining that revenue has
increased dramatically since the 2005 lockout, but a critical issue in the
coming years is generating revenue from television rights); see also Jon
Weinbach, A Line in the Ice: The Kovalchuk Contract and the NHL's Financial
Future, NHL FANHOUSE (July 26, 2010), http://nhl.fanhouse.com/2010/07/26/
a-line-in-the-ice-the-kovalchuk-contract-and-the-nhls-financia/ (noting how the
Kovalchuk events have exposed significant issues facing the NHL and
NHLPA, such as the League's financial health and the current leadership void
in the NHLPA, before the upcoming CBA negotiations).
66. See Klein & Hackel, supra note 9 (explaining that as a result of the
lockout, the NHL initiated "new rules" to bring back fans and increase
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victory as a result of the lockout, and the NHLPA was still licking
its wounds.6 7 In the ensuing years following the agreement, the
sides have had relative peace, but the bargaining position of the
NHLPA has been weakened due to internal concerns. 68 With the
upcoming CBA negotiations nearing, the Kovalchuk arbitration
decision has put the hockey world, and the world of professional
sports, on notice.69 In order to determine the scope and impact of
the decision, one must first evaluate the 2005 CBA. Only then is
one able to scrutinize the impact of the Bloch opinion, and the
resulting League decision on the amended Kovalchuk SPC.70 More
critically, the Kovalchuk decision can be used to predict the
potential implications on the next round of CBA negotiations.
viewership). "[T]he league adopted a sweeping set of changes that opened up
the game, following a decade of defensive domination. Rules allowing the twoline pass and cracking down on obstruction put a premium on speed and skill."
Id.
67. See BRUCE DOWBIGGIN, MONEY PLAYERS: THE AMAZING RISE AND FALL
OF BOB GOODENOW AND THE NHL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 7 (Key Porter Books
Limited 2006) (explaining that "[aifter vowing solidarity forever on the issue of
a salary cap in their industry, the players had been crushed in negotiations for
a collective agreement, agreeing to virtually all of management's major
issues.").
68. See id. at 9 (detailing the effect of the disastrous CBA negotiations on
Goodenow, as his authority over the NHLPA executive counsel and over the
players was significantly shattered); see also Kelley Ousted as Head of
NHLPA, ESPN (Aug. 31, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id
=4433555 (describing the firing of NHLPA executive director Paul Kelley and
subsequent resignings by other NHLPA top leadership); see also Players Hope
Fehr Takes Leadership Position With NHLPA, THE CANADIAN PRESS (July 12,
2010), http://www.tsn.ca/nhl/story/?id=327377 (detailing the overall NHL
player desire to have Donald Fehr, the former executive director of the MLB
Players Association, take the then vacant job as executive director for the
NHLPA). Fehr has since been elected by the players as the executive director
of the NHLPA. Donald Fehr Takes Over as NHLPA Boss, ESPN (Dec. 18,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=5932671.
69. See Tab Bamford, Ilya Kovalchuk Contract Void, Now What for the
NHL?, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 9, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
the
(noting that
432174-ilya-kovalchuk-contract-void-now-what-for-nhl
arbitration decision could have a significant impact on the NFL CBA
negotiations). See also League Locks Out Players After Union Decertifies,
Players],
Out
Locks
League
[hereinafter
NFL.COM
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81eb6e46/article/league-locks-outplayers-after-union-decertifies (last updated Mar. 13, 2011) (explaining that
the players dissolved the union despite two extensions to the collective
bargaining agreement, and the NFL and the owners imposed a lockout of the
players after the expiration of the agreement).
70. See Klein & Hackel, supra at 9 (noting that previous to the arbitration
decision, teams were already forced as a result of the hard salary cap and nocut contracts to trade players in order to stay under the constraints of the
salary cap provisions); see also Kristi Dosh, The NHL: Where No Contract Is
Safe, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/20
10/08/13/the-nhl-where-no-contract-is-safe/ (describing the significant increase
in long-term contracts as a result of the salary cap).
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The Impact of the 2005 CBA on Contract Formation
and Evaluation

In assessing the legality of the Kovalchuk SPC that was
rejected by the League and Bloch, both parties relied on the terms
of the 2005 CBA to guide their analyses. 7' The 2005 CBA
introduced several new elements regarding League structure that
brought the League more in line with the Commissioner's "cost
certainty" movement. 72 These changes included a hard salary
cap, 73 revenue sharing,74 a team payroll system including a floor
and a ceiling,75 two-way arbitration,76 and changes to free
agency.77
These modifications introduced a new economic system that
looked to balance team revenues and point the NHL back in the
right direction.7 8 More critically, Article 26, which deals with
circumvention, was significantly amended from the 1995 CBA to
prevent teams from attempting to evade new salary cap provisions
that had just been implemented.79 These provisions, articulated in
the new Article 50, deal specifically with what Commissioner
Bettman referred to as "cost certainty."8 0 The Kovalchuk SPC was
71. Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1.
72. See The NHL's New Deal, CBC SPORTS ONLINE (July 21, 2005),
http://www.cbc.calsports/indepth/cba/features/issuesdeal.html (detailing the
different components of the 2005 CBA, specifically a team salary cap and
limits to what elite players could earn as a percentage of the team's cap space).
The payroll range in 2005-06 was set between $21.5 million at the lower limit
and $39 million at the upper limit and no player could receive in excess of
twenty percent of the team's upper limit. Id.
73. Collective BargainingAgreement FAQs, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com
/ice/page.htm?id=26366.
74. See id. (noting that in order to allow teams to afford competitive
payrolls, teams that rank in the bottom half of League revenue are eligible for
revenue sharing subsidies).
75. See id. (illustrating the link between players' share of League-wide
revenue and a teams' salary cap room).
76. See id. (detailing that for the first time, teams have the right to elect
salary arbitration, where in the past only the players had this ability).
77. See id. (noting that the age for unrestricted free agency by the 20082009 season and for the duration of the agreement will be set at twenty-seven
years old with four accrued seasons, or with seven accrued seasons).
78. Klein & Hackel, supra note 9 (explaining that "[b]y agreement, player's
salaries were limited to 54 percent of the owners' hockey-related revenue, not
only halting salary inflation but also rolling back salaries 24 percent in the
cap's first season, when the ceiling per team was set at $39 million.").
79. Nat'l Hockey League Collective BargainingAgreement (1995): Article 26
- No Circumvention, NHL FANS' Ass'N, http://www.nhlfa.com/CBA/
cba-agreement26.asp.
80. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 160
(noting that "[t]his Article [50] creates a fixed relationship between League
wide Player Compensation and Hockey Related Revenues, and provides that
League wide Player Compensation will rise or fall in direct proportion to a rise
or fall in Hockey Related Revenues, and will equal. . . the Player's share.").
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drafted by men who understood the CBA and the boundaries that
had been imposed by the payroll range system. 81 Why Kovalchuk's
SPC was the contract to finally push the NHL to action is not
certain, but what is clear is that the 2005 CBA was drafted in a
way to give the NHL a significant amount of leeway to challenge
such a contract. 82
B. How ArbitratorBloch Interpreted the Kovalchuk SPC
The Kovalchuk SPC was not the first contract to challenge
the limits of the 2005 CBA.83 It was, however, the first to be
challenged by the NHL under the 2005 CBA.84 As a result, there
was little precedent to guide Bloch in his analysis.85 Like the NHL,
he used the terms of the 2005 CBA as a guide to frame his
opinion.88 These articles and sections will likely come under the
most scrutiny when the next CBA is negotiated and will thus be
addressed further in the Proposal section.
1. Bloch's Analysis of the 2005 CBA
Bloch looked specifically at Articles 11, 26, and 50.87 Article
88
11 provides the procedures for the approval process for all SPCs.
Bloch simply acknowledged that Article 11 provided the League
the right to review or reject the contract; however, it is significant
to note other components of Article 11 as well.89 Section 11.6(a)(i)
81. See Scott Burnside, Many Questions in Wake of Nixed Deal, ESPN (July
21, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/columns/story?columnist=burnside
scott&id=5398555 (explaining that Lou Lamoriello, the president and general
manager of the Devils, was intimately involved in the drafting of the 2005

CBA).
82. Id.
83. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 19 n.23 (discussing other
players' contracts that were previously registered that have come under
scrutiny); see also id. at 14 n.13 (describing how previous to the current
incarnation of Article 26 under the 2005 CBA and its revised language,
arbitrators' looked at players' SPCs on a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, rather than as specific factors that could lead to
circumvention).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 14 n.13 (noting that Bloch relied on the 1998 opinion of
arbitrator John Sands and the 2003 opinion of arbitrator Joan Parker to guide
his totality of the circumstances analysis in regard to Article 26 challenges).
86. See id. at 6-17 (providing the relevant terms and then applying the facts
to those terms).
87. Id. at 11-17.
88. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 40-42
(detailing the procedures by which a SPC is registered or rejected by the
NHL); see id. at 8 (defining a SPC as the "sole form of employment contract
used for all Player signings.").
89. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining that both
parties concede that the individual elements of the SPC do not violate the
CBA, but it is the NHL's contention that the SPC as a whole effectively
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articulates grounds for why an offer sheet or SPC could potentially
be rejected.90 In Kovalchuk's case, the rejection primarily had to do
with subsection (C) that notes "[a SPC may be rejected] because it
is or involves a Circumvention of either the Club's Upper Limit or
the Maximum Player Salary."91 Additionally, Subsection 11.5(e)
and 11.6(b) provide grounds for a subsequent challenge by the
League of a previously registered SPC.92 For players with
contracts bordering on circumvention, the terms of Article 11 were
not encouraging. 93
Both the NHL and NHLPA were able to contort Article 26 to
conform to their specific arguments.94 Bloch ultimately sided with
the NHL, largely because of the provisions embedded in Article
26.95 The two most significant parts of Article 26 in regard to the
opinion are Subsections 26.3(a) and 26.10(d).96 Subsection 26.3(a)
states that a team may not enter into a SPC with a player that has
the intention or effect of circumventing the provisions of the team
payroll range.9 7 Ultimately, Bloch looked to the provisions of
Article 26 to provide a more complete examination of a SPC.9 8
More critically, subsection 26.10(d) allows for unlimited time to
consider possible circumvention of NHL SPCs.99
Article 50, like Article 11, is structured to provide formal
guideposts for the formation of a SPC.10 It is Article 50 that sets
circumvents the provisions of the CBA).
90. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 42.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 41, 44-45 (noting that a SPC may be challenged under Article
11, concerning either a circumvention of a team's upper limit or the maximum
player salary, within sixty days from when the alleged circumvention became
known or reasonably should have been known).
93. Under Article 11, the use of power to review questionable SPCs would
be difficult to prove because the NHL likely had access to all suspect SPCs
during the approval process. Id. at 44-45.
94. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 5 (articulating the use by the
NHLPA of the Preamble to Article 26 to attempt to demonstrate that the
provisions of Kovalchuk's contract were permitted under a literal reading of
the text). However, the NHL broadly interprets the Preamble, which reads
"[t]his Article 26 is designed to prohibit and prevent conduct that Circumvents
the terms of this Agreement, while not deterring or prohibiting conduct
permitted by this Agreement, the latter conduct not being a Circumvention."
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supranote 39, at 115.
95. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 15 (detailing the expansive
reading of Article 26 that Bloch determines allows the clauses in Article 26 to
be read in accord).
96. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 115, 120.
97. Id.
98. Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 12.
99. This provision allows for unlimited challenges to the legality of SPCs, a
term which gives the NHL broad, almost absolute power. COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 120.
100. See id. at 160 (noting that player compensation will be based in direct
proportion to hockey related revenues).
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forth the salary cap provisions regarding team payroll range and
illustrates the methods by which a player's salary is calculated. 0 1
This is significant because the NHL, prior to the Kovalchuk
arbitration, counted the salary cap hit per year of a SPC as the
average of the salary over the course of the long-term contract.102
Thus, the Kovalchuk arbitration illuminated the glaring issues
with Article 50's payroll range system: a SPC stretched over a long
period of time could dramatically lower the salary cap hit on the
team, and this loophole enabled agents, players, and teams to
structure innovative contracts aimed at stretching the upper limit
of the team payroll range.103 These articles and sections must be
amended to more readily protect against potential cap
circumvention.
C. Implications of the Kovalchuk SPC on Other Players'Contracts
In the wake of the Kovalchuk arbitration decision, the initial
reaction was unease over the possibility of the League reexamining past SPCs under its Article 26 authority. 104 In utilizing
Bloch's opinion, the League could in effect establish its own
arbitrary limits on contract length, dollar amount, and
compensation terms.105 Although a literal reading of Article 26
certainly implies such an interpretation, in looking back to
agreements where the possible circumvention may not have been
as overt, and the effect of the agreement may not have been as
clear, the use of Bloch's opinion by the NHL as precedent was a
significant power play. 0 6 Likely appreciating some of these
arguments, the NHL and NHLPA agreed, contemporaneously with
the registering of the Kovalchuk SPC, to amend the 2005 CBA to
101. See id. at 204 (noting that the players' salaries and bonuses are
averaged over the length of the contract by dividing the aggregate amount of
the SPC by the number of years of the contract).
102. See Dosh, supra note 70 (explaining that by allowing this averaging of
salary over the course of the SPC to determine the salary cap hit, the NHL
effectively created a massive loophole that has allowed these cap breaking
contracts).
103. Id.
104. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 19 (detailing that "[w]hile the
contracts [of other players] have, in fact, been registered, their structure has
not escaped League notice: those SPCs are being investigated currently with
at least the possibility of a subsequent withdrawal of the registration.").
105. See id. at 15 (noting that on their own, these restrictions in the SPC do
not amount to circumvention). The 2005 CBA does not speak of these terms
explicitly, but Bloch interprets the agreement as a whole, rather than the
terms specifically. Id. As the NHLPA asserts, "there are no negotiated
restrictions that would serve to restrict the term, annual salary stipends,
backdive, or the Move/Trade language." Id. at 5 (although Bloch takes the
agreement as a whole, this language is telling in looking to other agreements
where the circumvention is not quite as clear).
106. Id.
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insulate against the review of previously approved contracts and
to enact new regulations to confront the issues highlighted by
Bloch's decision.107
The amendment agreed to by the parties specifically looked to
curb the exploitation of long-term deals for players entering their
late thirties and early forties, which included dramatic reductions
in salary.10 8 The new salary cap procedures were implemented to
long-term contracts defined as those of five years or longer in two
principal ways: First, long-term contracts, that include or extend
past a player's forty-first birthday, are calculated by totaling the
compensation amount before the forty-first birthday, and then
dividing by the number of years played.109 In the years including
the forty-first birthday and after, the player's salary cap amount is
determined by the amount paid to the player during those years. 110
Second, the amendment provided that for a long-term contract
with an average of more than $5.75 million for the three highestcompensation seasons, the salary cap amount for ages thirty-six to
forty must be a minimum of $1 million.111
The amendment was significant not only because it provided
more contractual certainty for the League, but also because it
allowed Kovalchuk's new SPC to stand and the League agreed to
cease investigation into the contracts of Marian Hossa, Chris
Pronger, Roberto Luongo, and Marc Savard. 112 Additionally, it
showed the ability and the willingness of the parties to work
together.113 In setting this agreement in place, even though the
new rules will not necessarily be part of the future CBA, teams
and players are better able to structure SPCs and allocate space
under their salary caps.1 14 More significantly, the agreement
provided a template for the NHL to reference for the upcoming
107. NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63.
108. Id.
109. Id. A player's salary cap number, after the 2005 CBA, was determined
by averaging the total amount of the contract over the course of the SPC, thus
allowing teams to lengthen contracts to lower the cap hit. Dosh, supra note
70.
110. NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63.
111. Id.
112. See id. (noting that the contracts in question were grandfathered in by
the NHL).
113. See Tom Gulitti, NHL and NHLPA Reach Agreement, Kovalchuk Deal
To Be Approved, FIRE & ICE (Sept. 3, 2010), http://blogs.northjersey.con/
blogs/fireice/reports-nhl-and-nhlpa-reachagreement kovalchuk dealtobe_
approved/ (noting that the NHLPNs thirty-member player board gave the
negotiators preapproval to agree to the amendment). This is especially
significant because twenty votes are typically needed for an amendment to be
accepted. Id.
114. See NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63 (detailing that the
agreement provides clarity to agents and general managers in the negotiation
of new contracts).

The John MarshallLaw Review

162

[45:145

CBA negotiations.
D. Ramifications of the Kovalchuk SPC on the 2011-2012
CBA Negotiations

It is uncertain what the 2011-2012 negotiations will bring,
but the NHL is at a significant advantage by going through the
process after the NFL, NBA, and MLB all go through their CBA
negotiations. 115 What is certain is that issues of contract, labor,
and antitrust law will be utilized to achieve the NHL and
NHLPA's bargaining demands. 116
While sports antitrust suits have been associated mostly with
MLB and the NFL, the NHL has also experienced significant
antitrust challenges. 117 Ironically, it is the NFL, and a suit by
American Needle, that ensured that the NHL players would have
the ability to assert claims for antitrust violations under Section I
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 118 Once the current agreement
expires, should the League decide to push forward and make the
new amendment to the CBA a part of the next CBA, the NHL
players, as a union, may elect to decertify the union and bring an
antitrust action.119 Any threat of union decertification, as seen
recently in the NFL and the NBA, is always reason for concern to
the League. 120 Strikes or decertification in professional sports can

115. See Kristi Dosh, The NHL Extended It's Labor Agreement - Now What?,
FORBES (June 29, 2010), http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney/2010/06/29/thenhl-extended-its-labor-agreement-now-what/ (explaining that "[t]he NFL's
agreement expires in March 2011, the NBA and NHL's after the 2010-2011
season, MLB's following the 2011 season."); see also Judy Battista, N.F.L.
Players Union to Vote on Decertification, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2010,
(noting that
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/sports/football/12nfl.html
NFL teams have begun the process of voting to give the NFLPA permission to
decertify in the event of an owner induced lockout of the players).
116. See Battista, supra note 115 (detailing the potential labor and antitrust
issues if the NFL owners decide to lockout the players).
117. McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Phila.
World Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. at 462; Madison Square Garden, L.P. v.
NHL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80475 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008).
118. See Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215-16 (2010)
(determining that the NFL is not a "single entity" but rather a joint venture
subject to scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for
restricting competition).
119. See Mike Ozanian, Supreme Court Hands Pro Athletes Big Victory,
FORBES (May 24, 2010), http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney/2010/05/24/su
preme-court-hands-pro-athletes-big-victory/?boxes=businesschannelsections
(noting that the American Needle decision provides the NHL players
significant power to sue on Antitrust grounds should the union decide to
decertify).
120. Battista, supra note 115. See also League Locks Out Players, supra note
69 (explaining that by dissolving the union, the players were able to bring
class-action lawsuits against the NFL attacking "the league's policies on the
draft, salary cap and free-agent restrictions such as franchise-player tags.");
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be even more dramatic due to the difficult nature of finding
replacement players with comparable skill.
While the Kovalchuk decision highlights the NHL and
NHLPA's ability to come to agreement, the dispute over the SPC
illustrates that the parties continue to dispute significant
elements of the 2005 CBA.121 The NHL, in rejecting Kovalchuk's
SPC, seemed to be trying to do what they could not achieve in the
2005 CBA, effectively setting a limitation on contract length; the
reality of which cannot sit well with the NHLPA.122 These are
factors the NHL players will certainly consider before coming to
the negotiating table for the 2011-2012 CBA negotiations.1 23
With regard to potential labor law issues, another option for
the players and the League is that of a strike or lockout to induce
the other side into action and to bring unfair labor practice
charges to the National Labor Relations Board. 124 This is not an
attractive option for several reasons, the main being what the
League experienced in 1992, 1995, and 2004.125 A strike or lockout
is a significant economic weapon for both sides, as there is a
substantial amount of money at stake; however, another long
lockout would be devastating for the NHL. Another possibility, as
discussed above, would be for the players to decertify the union.126
Marc Stein, NBA Players Reject Owners' Offer, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/n
balstory/id/7234180/nba-lockout-players-not-accept-deal-seek-disband-billyhunter-says (last updated Nov. 15, 2011, 12:52 PM) (noting that the players
voted unanimously to file a "disclaimer of interest" that will dissolve the
union.").
121. See Dosh, supra note 115 (noting that in deciding to exercise their
option to extend the 2005 CBA by one year, the determination had more to do
with the fact that there are so many issues for the parties to resolve than the
possibility that both sides are content with the current terms of the 2005
CBA).
122. See Allan Maki, NHL, Devils Make Kovalchuk Deal, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Sept. 3, 2010, 2:55 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/nhldevils-make-kovalchuk-deallarticlel695576/ (noting that the NHL "[1league
officials had tried to get a cap on contract lengths in bargaining talks five
years ago but were unsuccessful. When Kovalchuk's original New Jersey
contract was rejected, the NHL was able to push for and get limits on future
deals, something it failed to secure in bargaining.").
123. Id.
124. DOWBIGGIN, supra note 67, at 176-77.
125. See id. (discussing the concessions of the NHLPA from the 1995 lockout
which resulted in a rookie salary cap, highly restricted free agency, and
significantly limited salary arbitration).
126. Battista, supra note 115. See also Gabriel A. Feldman, The Legal Issues
Behind the NBA Players' Decertification Strategy, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM,
Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feldman/the-legalissues-behind-t_2 b 1081107.html (noting that there are multiple steps to
decertify a union, while the process for disclaimer of interest is much simpler).
The process for decertification is as follows: (1) At least thirty percent of the
players must sign a petition stating they no longer want the union to
represent them; (2) the petition must be filed with the National Labor
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Either of these uses of labor law weapons would have dramatic
ramifications. 2 7
Regardless of whether the NHL players decide not to decertify
or utilize a strike, negotiations will certainly include subjects that
were examined in the Kovalchuk SPC like the "No Circumvention"
clauses in Article 26 and the salary cap clauses of Article 50.128
While the sides are in negotiations over a new CBA, the NHL will
be protected from antitrust suits by the non-statutory labor
exemption, as long as the players do not decertify the union. 129
By challenging the Kovalchuk SPC, the League effectively
opened the negotiation process a year early.so In this initial
battle, both parties were able to take away something, with the
League implementing significant restrictions on long-term
contracts, and the NHLPA getting the League to drop its
investigations of other suspect SPCs and "grandfathering" in
Kovalchuk's SPC.131 The League was also able to close the loophole
in the 2005 CBA with the amendment and thereby effectively
prevented future SPCs from similar circumventions.132 However, it
is likely that creative agents and teams will find more loopholes in
the current CBA to exploit before the new negotiations. 13 3 What is
Relations Board, which then must verify the petition and schedule an election;
and (3) an election will be held where at least fifty percent of the voting
players must opt to decertify the union. Id.
127. See Mike Florio, Goodell Says Decertification Talk Could Hurt CBA
Talks, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 13, 2010, 4:44 PM), http://profootballtal
k.nbcsports.com/2010/09/13/goodell-says-decertification-talk-could-hurt-cbatalks/ (noting that should the players decertify the NHLPA, the owners may
elect to change mandatory subjects of bargaining as long as they do not violate
antitrust laws).
128. Dosh, supra note 115.
129. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)
(noting that if the Mackey three-prong test is met, then the League is shielded
from antitrust challenges by the non-statutory labor exemption). The test is
that: (1) the restraint must only affect the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship; (2) the exemption must be related to a mandatory subject of
bargaining; and (3) the agreement must be the product of bona fide arm'slength negotiations. Id.
130. Maki, supra note 122.
131. See NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63 (discussing the
terms of the agreement); see also Allan Muir, NHL, NHLPA Bargain a WinWin for Future Negotiations, SI VAULT (Sept. 4, 2010), http://157.166.255.4/v
ault/article/web/COM1174087/1/index.htm (explaining that contractual clarity
is a win for the League, but also that the preapproving agreement from thirty
player representatives was a significant win for the NHLPA).
132. NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63.
133. See Jim Kelley, Devils Making NHL Sweat, Another Miscarriage of
Justice, SI VAULT (Oct. 14, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.c
nn.com/2010/writers/jim kelley/10/14/lamoriello.hjalmarsson.notes/index.htm
(noting that another current loophole in the 2005 CBA is being able to send a
player to the minor leagues to avoid their cap hit, and a critical issue could be
minimum roster size).
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clear is that Article 11 continues to grant the League the ability to
review SPCs, and the NHL may still retroactively review contracts
under Article 26, albeit not the ones that have been certified as a
component of the amendment. 134
The agreement of the parties indicates that both the NHL
and NHLPA are prepared to bargain to bring more certainty to
SPCS.135 What is uncertain is whether or not that will translate to
bargaining success when faced with potential antitrust and labor
issues.136 If the NHL can amend the CBA to reflect a viable longterm structure, then they will be able to avoid a potential labor
shutdown.
IV. PROPOSAL
The NHL should permanently incorporate the 2010
amendment and slightly modify Articles 11, 26, and 50 to further
prevent SPCs that either intentionally or inadvertently
circumvent the salary cap provisions of the CBA.13 7 Based on
recent experience with CBA negotiations between the NHL and
NHLPA, the forecast for the 2011-2012 negotiations does not look
promising; however, the Kovalchuk arbitration decision and
resulting amendment to the 2005 CBA may be a push in the right
direction.138 While the negotiations are set to begin in less than
one year, the Kovalchuk arbitration provides a significant
precedent for the NHL to rely on for future debate over the merits
of a salary cap, the averaging of a player's salary as it relates to
the cap implications, and the NHL's Article 26 powers to review
SPCS.139 Now that a salary cap is in place, the likelihood of
returning to a deregulated system where the market determines
salaries is slim to none. 140 The salary cap is here to stay; the
question now is how the NHL and NHLPA can best allocate the
134. NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63.
135. Muir, supra note 131.
136. See Dosh, supra note 115 (noting that some critical issues to be
determined at the next CBA negotiations are a new television contract, how
the salary cap will be determined, and player escrow withholdings).
137. While these must be considered significant changes to the 2005 CBA,
practicing a "win-win" philosophy and returning to a partnership relationship
will be key in order to maintain the stability of the League. GIL STEIN, POWER
PLAYS: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE BIG BUSINESS OF THE NATIONAL HOCKEY
LEAGUE 104-05 (Birch Lane Press 1997).
138. See DOWBIGGIN, supra note 67, at 301 (noting that "[h]ow the NHL
copes with the next crisis . . . will eventually say whether the lockout of 200405 was a proper correction of the market or simply a delaying tactic before
tackling its real issues head-on.").
139. See NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63 (detailing the
amendments to the 2005 CBA as a result of the Kovalchuk arbitration).
140. Lyle Richardson, Potential Issues for NHL's Next Round of CBA Talks,
Fox SPORTS (Sept. 4, 2009, 12:15 PM), http://community.foxsports.com/spector/
blog/2009/09/04/potentialissuesfor nhls next-round of cba talks.
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resulting revenue between the teams, the League, and the
players. 141 By amending the 2005 CBA to better reflect the current
economic landscape, the parties will be able to largely retain the
structure of the old CBA and integrate a long-term solution.142
Additionally, the NHL should look to other sports to incorporate
increased flexibility into the cap.143
The opportunity to have the NBA, NFL, and MLB go through
the CBA negotiations first will allow both sides additional insight
into potential bargaining strategy.144 The fact that Donald Fehr
will take the reins as executive director of the NHLPA is good
news for the players association, a union desperately in need of
leadership, but could also spell the makings of protracted labor
strife.145
A. Retain the Framework of the 2005 CBA but Overhaul
Circumvention and Salary Cap Provisions
The NHL must largely retain the current structure of the
CBA, albeit incorporating the 2010 amendment into the 2005
CBA.146 This clearly is an attractive option for NHL fans, and
something that is likely to materialize even with some contentious
issues that the 2005 CBA has not fully remedied for both
parties.147 With some quid pro quo changes to the salary cap

141. See Pierre LeBrun, Points to Ponder on Future of the CBA, ESPN (Oct.
1, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/preview2010/columns/story?
columnist=1ebrun-pierre&id=5636853 (noting that the percentage of League
revenue players will receive under the new salary cap will be a critical term of
the new CBA).
142. Prior to 1991, the NHL and NHLPA bargained as a partnership, and
the CBAs were negotiated well before the CBA was to expire. STEIN, supra
note 137, at 105. During this time, CBAs were amended, but largely retained
fidelity to the past agreement. Id.
143. See Richardson, supra note 140 (noting that as of 2009, the League was
interested in implementing a system that incorporated nonguaranteed
contracts, something the players would be vehemently against that could
dramatically reshape the identity of the salary cap). Another key issue is that
the current CBA allows teams to stash players in the minor leagues or in
Europe to avoid the players' salary cap hit. LeBrun, supra note 141.
144. Dosh, supra note 115. See also Feldman, supra note 126 (noting that
"players are required to make a choice between labor law (and collective
bargaining) and antitrust law (and individual bargaining and litigation).").
145. See Jeff Levine, Labor Issues, Fehr-Bettman Relationship, Take Center
Stage as 2010-11 Season Looms, THE Biz OF HOcKEY (Oct. 4, 2010, 4:10 PM),
http:/Ibizofhockey.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=399:1
abor-issues-fehr-bettman-relationship-take-center-stage-as-2010-11-seasonlooms&catid=46:articles-and-opinions&Itemid=64 (discussing the collective
fear that Fehr may adopt a more militant approach to bargaining, similar to
the approach that was successful for Goodenow in the late 1990s).
146. See LeBrun, supra note 141 (noting that the League is generally
satisfied with the system in place).
147. See Levine, supra note 145 (detailing that the financial interests of both
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structure and escrow account contributions, along with subtle
redrafting to the CBA, the parties could emerge from the
negotiations process relatively unscathed. 148 With new leadership
and a solidified union, the parties could come out as a stronger
partnership, but this is largely dependent upon the relations of
Bettman and Fehr.149 It will certainly encourage the negotiation
process if the players do not resort to a decertification of the
union.150
The players would get significant changes to escrow account
contributions along with a CBA that still allows for significant
contracts to free agents.11 The NHL players currently give back a
portion of their salaries for escrow contributions to protect the
League in the event that it overpays the players; a cap on these
contributions would go a long way toward appeasing the
players.1 52 On the other hand, the League would get further
changes to the salary cap structure.153 If the 2010 amendment is
maintained, the League will have already secured a significant
victory in being able to set limits on contract term length, which
ultimately affects the total dollar amount available under the
cap.154 The owners should also look to adjust the age when players

the NHL and NHLPA will be a contentious issue that will drive the
negotiations for both sides).
148. See id. (noting that the main issues that will be negotiated will be the
"percentage of hockey-related revenue ... which is allocated toward paying
player salary" and the player escrow account contributions).
149. Id.
150. Battista, supra note 115.
151. See Richardson, supra note 140 (noting that, like the salary cap, escrow
account contributions, a creation of the 2005 CBA, are likely here to stay). In
October 2010, Zdeno Chara of the Boston Bruins signed a seven-year, $45.5
million extension, which was one of the first SPCs to invoke the newly minted
Kovalchuk amendments to the 2005 CBA. James Murphy, Zdeno CharaSigns
7-Year Extension, ESPN (Oct. 10, 2010, 7:39 AM), http://sports.espn.g
o.com/boston/nhl/news/story?id=5665335. This deal indicates that similar
"long-term" deals can be structured for veteran players that extend the term of
the contract into their forties. Id.
152. LeBrun, supra note 141. Once final calculations for hockey-related
revenue [HRR] are determined, the players receive a portion of the escrow
money back, but this return is certainly not guaranteed. Id. For example, the
NBA has an escrow cap for the 2010-2011 season that is set at eight percent.
Jonathan Givony, NBA CBA Principal Deal Points, Rookie and Minimum
Salary Scales, DRAFrEXPRESS (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.draftexpress.com
/article/NBA-CBA-Principal-Deal-Points,-Rookie-and-Minimum-Salary-Scales1065/nba.php.
153. See LeBrun, supra note 141 (noting that lowering the percentage of the
players' share of the League-wide revenue and allowing a larger gap between
the salary range are topics that will likely be discussed during the next CBA
negotiations).
154. See generally NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63
(illustrating the potential long-term benefits of the amendment).
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reach unrestricted free agency to control salary. 55
At the same time, significant aspects of Article 26 must be
restructured both in the interests of the League and the
NHLPA.156 Specifically, the Preamble to Article 26, Section 26.3(i),
and 26.10(d) must be amended to provide further certainty to
future negotiations over SPCs.157 By further articulating which
agreements could rise to the level of circumvention, the NHL and
NHLPA will better be able to prevent teams from exploiting
potential loopholes in the next CBA. 58
The Preamble to Article 26 should be changed to incorporate
language inferred in the Kovalchuk arbitration agreement that
would further specify circumventing behavior.15 9 The Preamble
currently reads: "This Article 26 is designed to prohibit and
prevent conduct that Circumvents the terms of this Agreement,
while not deterring or prohibiting conduct permitted by this
Agreement, the latter conduct not being a Circumvention."16 0 By
supplementing the Preamble with words indicating a heightened
standard of review of SPCs, the text would come more in line with
the intent of the agreement.11 This could be achieved as set forth:
and prevent conduct that Circumvents the terms of this Agreement,
including, but not limited to, conduct that, based on the totality of
the circumstances, intends to or has the effect of defeating or
Circumventing the provisions of this Agreement or the intention of
the parties as reflected by the provisions of this Agreement, while not
deterring or prohibiting conduct permitted by this Agreement ...
162

155. LeBrun, supra note 141. The key elements that lead to higher salaries
for players are "free agency (especially unrestricted free agency), salary
arbitration, guaranteed contracts, no salary tax or cap, [and] the right to
license players' images for profit." DOWBIGGIN, supra note 67, at 177-78.
156. Kristi Dosh, Understanding Subsequent Challenges to NHL Contracts,
FORBES (Aug. 17, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/
2010/08/17/understanding-subsequent-challenges-to-nhl-contracts/ (explaining
that "[tihere is no guidance as to which article prevails in the event of
a circumvention related to a player contract-Article 11 with its 60-day time
frame and minimal penalties or Article 26, which gives the Commissioner
unlimited time to investigate and carries the possibility of substantial
penalties."). The confusion between which article is to be relied on leaves
Commissioner Bettman with a tremendous amount of power to review
contracts unilaterally. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. (noting that the conflict between Article 11 and Article 26 is one
instance where the drafting of the CBA can be better composed to provide
guidance to the agents, players, and teams).
159. Id.
160. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 115.
161. See Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 14 n.13 (noting the need,
based on recent arbitration decisions, to allow for review based on the "totality
of the circumstances," and not "specific benchmarks").
162. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 115.
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The revised Preamble represents a more comprehensive
illustration depicting the intentions of both the NHL and
NHLPA.163 While the rewording is closer in line with the NHL's
interpretation, as dictated by Bloch's decision, this broad
interpretation allows for greater certainty as both parties seek to
negotiate a SPC.164 The parties negotiating the SPC must be even
more vigilant to guard against potential circumventing behavior
by knowing that conduct as a whole may trigger the
circumvention.165 Section 26.3(i) would also need to be similarly
amended. 6 6 It would read: "Any act, conduct, or activity that is
permitted by this Agreement[, based on the totality of the
circumstances,] shall not be a Circumvention."
While this amendment to the Preamble would certainly be a
concession for the players, a concession for the owners could be a
modification of the reviewability of SPCs under Article 26.167 The
power of the Commissioner currently under 26.10(d) allows for
unlimited review of a SPC for potential circumvention.168 This
level of review should be modified to align with review under
Article 11.169 Article 11.6(b) states that:
[Ain approved and registered SPC may be subject to subsequent
challenge and/or de-registration by the League ... in the case of a
Circumvention relating to either the Club Upper Limit or the
Maximum Player Salary, within sixty (60) days from the date upon
which the facts of the Circumvention became known or reasonably
should have been known to the NHL ... 170
To come more in line with the principles of certainty that the
League dictates in terms of its finances, it would be in the interest
of the NHL to make Article 26 review more consistent with Article
11 review.171

163. Nat'l Hockey League, supra note 1, at 14.
164. Id. at 15. Bloch determined that it was the intention of the parties to
read Article 26 very broadly in order to give power to the words of the 2005
CBA. Id.
165. Id. at 14.
166. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 118.
167. Article 26 currently allows for a much broader and expansive review of
player contracts than Article 11.
168. Id. at 120.
169. See Dosh, supra note 156 (noting the differences in the processes for
review of SPCs under Articles 11 and 26).
170. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 39, at 44-45.
171. See id. As further support for this argument, the current Article 11 of
the 2005 CBA never at any point references Article 26. Id. Article 26.10 states
that approval under Article 11 of a SPC does not limit Article 26's review, but
that is the extent of the correlative text. Id. at 119-20.
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B. Look to Other Sports as a Guide for IncreasedFlexibility
The salary cap system must be replaced with a structure that
allows for increased flexibility to retain players of all wage
levels. 172 With Fehr in place, the NHLPA certainly could try to
assert its collective muscle and attempt to balance the parties'
bargaining power. 173 The League and NHLPA should look to what
other sports have done recently in their CBAs to allow for
flexibility under the salary cap. 174 This could include having a
player's actual salary attributable to that year count towards the
salary cap,175 allowing players to receive guaranteed money with
the possibility of releasing players similar to the current NFL
system,1 76 adding a franchise player similar to the NFL,177 or
adding exceptions similar to how the NBA functioned under their
previous collective bargaining agreement. 178
The current NHL CBA has put a premium on teams'
management of their cap space.179 Teams have been forced to trade
172. See LeBrun, supra note 141 (noting that the current salary cap
structure is one of the most contentious issues between small-market and
large-market teams, and alternatively between the players and the League).
The likely changes will be the age that players can reach unrestricted free
agency and potentially a modification of how a player's salary cap impact is
calculated over the course of his SPC. Id.
173. See Levine, supra note 145 (explaining that if and when Donald Fehr
becomes the executive director of the NHLPA, it is more likely that he will
take a more moderate stance in negotiating with Bettman and the NHL).
174. See CBA: The NFL Model, ANDREW'S DALLAS STARS PAGE (Dec. 14,
2003), http://www.andrewsstarspage.com/CBA/12-14cba.htm (detailing the
need to look to the NFL for guidance as to revenue sharing and the salary cap
before the 2005 NHL agreement was formulated).
175. See Dosh, supra note 70 (explaining that the NHL is the only league to
utilize a system where the cap hit is not the actual salary attributable to that
year of the contract). This was effectively the main conduit that teams used to
circumvent the salary cap provisions. Id. Moving to a system like the other
major sports will require teams to be more creative in utilizing the salary cap
to construct their respective teams. Id.
176. See Ross Tucker, Guaranteed Contracts Are Risky Business for NFL
Teams, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 4, 2009, 1:02 PM), http://sportsillust
rated.cnn.com/2009/writers/ross-tucker/03/04/guarantees/index.html
(noting
the increase in contracts relying on guaranteed money, but also the inherent
risks involved in such deals).
177. See Franchise and Transition Tender Amounts, NFL.CoM,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d806a24a3&template=withoutvideo&confirm=true (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (detailing the difference
between exclusive and nonexclusive franchise tags and how the franchise tag
allows teams to retain their top free agent players).
178. See NBA Salary Cap, SPORTSCITY, http://www.sportscity.com/NBA/Sa
lary-Cap/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (stating the fact that the NBA functions
under a soft cap that allows for several exceptions including a Mid-level
exception, the Larry Bird exception, and the Rookie exception).
179. See Klein & Hackel, supra note 9 (discussing that "[m]anaging the
complicated provisions of the cap system quickly became an essential part of
building a team [after the 2005 CBA], and it didn't take long until clubs were
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away players they have wanted to retain, either because of bad
management decisions or mismanagement of the cap. 180 The NHL
hard cap puts a serious stress on strong management decisions
because there is currently little room for error with guaranteed,
no-cut contracts.18 1 If the NHL finds itself more economically
stable after the 2011-2012 season, a move toward allowing
flexibility in the salary cap would decrease player movement and
allow more players to remain with their current teams.18 2 This
could be achieved by framing SPCs with guaranteed money with
the possibility of release. 183 This would minimize the need for
teams to "hide" unwanted players in the minors or abroad and
allow teams to be as competitive as possible, while still retaining
the salary cap principles. 184 The main issue here is that any talk of
player release would likely bring a labor dispute, but a
combination with a cap on escrow account contributions, or similar
concession, could ameliorate the players' concerns.
Also, exceptions should be structured for teams to exceed
their salary cap ceiling to retain players, even if it is just for a
year. 185 The NBA has experimented with a series of exemptions
that give an advantage to a player's original team in order to limit
player movement.188 The use of these exceptions is likely only
forced to trade players to stay under the cap."). Teams can bury mistakes to
some degree by sending players to the minors or abroad to Europe, but for the
most part teams have been forced to truly deliberate before handing out cap
breaking SPCs. Id.
180. Id.
181. One of the few exceptions to this rule is for players to be sent to the
minors or abroad. See, e.g., Blackhawks Send G Cristobal Huet to Swiss Team,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Sept.
27,
2010,
http://www.nhl.com
/ice/news.htm?id=538821 (relating that the Chicago Blackhawks were able to
send Cristobal Huet to a Swiss team and continued to pay his $5.6 million
annual salary, but that salary had no salary cap implications).
182. See generally Ken Berger, Should NBA adopt NFL-like Player
Movement Rules?, CBSSPORTS.COM (July 30, 2010), http://www.cbssports.co
m/nbalstory/13683901/should-nba-adopt-nfllike-player-movement-rules-goodquestion (noting that providing the NBA with flexibility from a franchise tag
would allow teams to limit player movement).
183. See id. (explaining that guaranteed contracts that allow for cuts are
more prevalent in the NFL where players are considered more easily
replaceable than players in the NBA).
184. See Blackhawks Send G Cristobal Huet to Swiss Team, supra note 181
(exemplifying a case where a player was transferred abroad). Contracts that
leave open the possibility of release encourage players to play at a high level,
while at the same time maximizing salary cap space. Richardson, supra note
140.
185. See LeBrun, supra note 141 (noting that flexibility is especially critical
for players thirty-five and older, because currently teams are reluctant to sign
such players for fear of being stuck with the cap hit if the player retires).
186. See generally Jorge Castillo, NBA Free Agency: Salary Cap Exceptions
Explained, WASH. POST, July 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/02/AR2010070202011.html (discussing the various
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feasible for large-market teams that can compensate players
beyond the salary cap, but the use of one exception may allow
187
more franchise flexibility to maintain the structure of the teams.
While small-market teams may still not have the finances to keep
their players, the concern here for small-market teams would be
alleviated by an exception to the cap that allows teams to add
additional years and compensation to a contract, beyond what
other teams can offer, to retain their players.
Finally, the NHL should consider allowing teams to
"franchise" a player. 188 Small-market teams would be thrilled to
implement a system with franchise players as they would be able
to retain players for a lower cost, even if it is just for a year or
two. 189 These potential exceptions to a hard salary cap will allow
players to keep making money, and at the same time allow teams
to retain elite players at reasonable costs.190 Of these exceptions to
the hard salary cap, a "franchise" tag is the most integral to the
future success of the NHL. While it would break with the tradition
of the hard salary cap, it would allow small-market teams to retain
their elite players.
V. CONCLUSION
While the full significance of the Kovalchuk arbitration
decision will not be realized until the actual negotiations begin
over a new CBA, the initial impact of the decision has already
been felt.19 1 When the NHL and NHLPA agreed to amend the 2005
CBA to prevent cap circumventing SPCs, thereby allowing
Kovalchuk's contract and other similar contracts to stand, both
parties demonstrated their willingness to negotiate. However, they
also showed their readiness to do battle over the terms of the CBA
that have significant impact on League and player economics. 192
With the insertion of Fehr into the ranks of NHLPA
exceptions to the NBA soft salary cap).
187. Id.
188. Franchiseand TransitionTender Amounts, supra note 177.
189. See id. (explaining that:
[c]lubs can designate an exclusive franchise player by offering a oneyear contract for an amount no less than the average of the top five
salaries at the player's position at the end of the restricted free agent
signing period, or a 20 percent increase over his 20[10] salary, or the
average of the top five salaries at his position at the end of last season whichever of the three is greater.)
190. See id. (noting that in the case of nonexclusive franchising, a team may
be compensated with two first-round draft choices if the player elects to
negotiate with a different team).
191. See NHL, NHLPA Reach Agreement, supra note 63 (noting that the
terms of the agreement will apply to long-term contracts that are executed
after September 4, 2010, and will apply to contracts that are signed between
now and the end of the CBA but will not carry over into a new CBA).
192. Id.
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leadership as executive director, the NHLPA looks to be solidifying
itself as a legitimate negotiating power, something that the
League has to somewhat fear. 193 That is why establishing a longterm solution for the CBA as suggested in the Proposal section is
critical. 194 With a League where popularity and revenue streams
appear to be rising, the prospects for future viability and success
seem limitless.195 The impact of the Kovalchuk decision on not only
the NHL, but also on MLB, the NFL, and the NBA, CBA
negotiations could be dramatic.196
What is certain is that sports leagues and players alike will
now look to Bloch's decision as a guidepost as to how to frame their
collective bargaining agreements. By reaching an agreement that
is in the interests of both parties, based upon Bloch's decision and
past NHL/NHLPA collective bargaining experience, the NHL will
be able to avoid a labor dispute or antitrust suit, and truly cement
itself as a legitimate money-making enterprise.

193. Levine, supra note 145.
194. Id.
195. See Dan Shaughnessy, NHL's Winter Classic Makes Every New Year's
Day a Hockey Day, SI.CoM (Dec. 28, 2009, 12:15 PM), http://sportsillustrated.c
nn.com/2009/writers/dan-shaughnessy/12/28/winter.classic/index.html (noting
the significance of the Winter Classic on rebuilding the NHL image); see also
NHL TV Negotiations Will Be All About Exposure, SPORTINGNEWS (Oct. 26,
2010, 4:18 PM), http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2010-10-26/nhl-tvnegotiations-will-be-all-about-exposure (detailing the need for the NHL to look
to generate more of a cash flow from its next television contracts).
196. Dosh, supra note 115. See also Feldman, supra note 126 (noting that the
players will likely challenge under antitrust law "the NBA's salary cap, the
player draft, and other player and free agency restrictions.").

